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Governance in online communities is an increasingly high-stakes challenge, and yet many basic features of
offline governance legacies—juries, political parties, term limits, and formal debates, to name a few—are not in
the feature-sets of the software most community platforms use. Drawing on the paradigm of Institutional
Analysis and Design, this paper proposes a strategy for addressing this lapse by specifying basic features of a
generalizable paradigm for online governance called Modular Politics. Whereas classical governance typologies
tend to present a choice among wholesale ideologies, such as democracy or oligarchy, the paper argues for
enabling platform operators and their users to build bottom-up governance processes from computational
components that are modular, highly versatile in their expressiveness, portable from one context to another,
and interoperable across platforms. This kind of approach could implement pre-digital governance systems as
well as accelerate innovation in uniquely digital techniques. As diverse communities share and connect their
components and data, governance could come to occur as a ubiquitous network layer. To that end, this paper
proposes the development of an open standard for networked governance.
1 INTRODUCTION
Many of the pressing social questions surrounding Internet technology and culture are questions of
governance. Who should set policies that govern others’ behavior? What content should and shouldn’t
be allowed? What should be done with users’ personal data? How should economic value be distributed?
Yet the governance tools available for online networks—such as social media groups, multiplayer
games, and peer-production projects—are remarkably impoverished, typically relying on assigning
unchecked power to admins and moderators [114]. Such basic mechanisms as elections, boards,
term limits, and transparent decision-making are norms for any incorporated entity in robust
legal regimes, but to the extent that they do occur in online networks, they are costly to build and
maintain, and they typically must be implemented by means extraneous to the feature-set of the
network’s platform itself. Perhaps it is thus not surprising that monarchic or oligarchic practices
emerge in online networks more easily and frequently than liberal or democratic ones [45, 58, 114].
We propose a strategy for addressing this lapse by modeling and specifying a governance layer
for online networks with the following eventual design goals:
(1) Modularity: Platform operators and community members should have the ability to con-
struct systems by creating, importing, and arranging component parts together as a coherent
whole.
(2) Expressiveness: The governance layer should be able to implement as wide a range of
processes as possible, with minimal bias for one kind of process over another.
(3) Portability: Governance tools developed for one platform should be portable to another
platform for reuse and adaptation.
(4) Interoperability: Governance systems operating on different platforms and protocols should
have the ability to interact with each other, sharing data and influencing each other’s pro-
cesses.
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To achieve these, we suggest the development of an open standard, along with supporting
software libraries. We call our model “Modular Politics.”
There have been numerous tools available for Internet-based governance [1], ranging from the
experimental 1982 text-based game Nomic [127] and the VOTEMGR software available for the
early FidoNet bulletin board system [19] to current cloud-based platforms like Election Runner that
assist, for example, in elections for corporate boards and "liquid democracy," which several Pirate
Parties around the world use to build their political platforms [73]. Others, such as Loomio [64],
provide a platform for deliberation and community building as well as various voting mechanisms.
The self-hostable multiplayer game Minecraft allows administrators to install “mod” plugins that
can include tools for governance [45]. A new wave of governance systems is emerging among
distributed-ledger technologies, particularly surrounding the concept of decentralized autonomous
organizations, or DAOs [2, 27, 110]. The present approach differs in that it involves not a distinct
platform or cryptographic token on which to conduct governance but a strategy for embedding
customizable governance mechanisms into a range of virtual environments. Through our model,
communities have the capacity to create and iterate around their evolving needs, sharing their
innovations with other communities and accelerating their collective governance tool-set.
This paper presents an outline of Modular Politics, a set of flexible governance tools that can be
exist atop diverse platforms, according to an open standard. What follows is a conceptual overview
intended as a prologue for future theoretical, technical, and empirical work, not a specification
or theory. For example, this overview does not consider matters such as security and database
structures that will be vital at the design stage, nor does it present the kinds of empirical claims
that we expect to develop and test with an eventual prototype. We recognize that no computational
system can capture the embodied and cultural fullness of human governance practices; at best,
computational tools can facilitate those non-computational processes. In what follows, we merely
hope to offer a promising starting point for future research.
First we will review other approaches to designing online governance regimes that motivate
our design goals. We will then present a preliminary sketch of the basic features that we expect
Modular Politics to include, followed by some examples of how our model might work in practice.
Next, we consider strategies for implementation, proposing the development of an open standard,
and conclude with a discussion of future research directions enabled by Modular Politics.
2 BACKGROUND
The governance of online communities has long been a topic of study within the fields of computer-
supported cooperative work, social computing, and computer-mediated communication. Early
studies examined discussion groups hosted on newsgroups [75], mailing lists [26, 61], Internet Relay
Chat clients [109], or bulletin board systems [125]. In the past several decades, researchers have
gone on to study the governance of large-scale peer production communities such asWikipedia [41]
and open source software projects [116], online multiplayer games such as League of Legends [77],
as well as large social media platforms such as Facebook [74].
2.1 Problems in Online Communities
Participants in early discussion and gaming communities complained about reoccurring issues of
unwanted behavior, including spam and harassment [31], as well as conflicts with other members,
sometimes called “flame wars” [128]. Today, online harassment and trolling have gone mainstream
with the ubiquity of social interaction online, resulting in evidence that nearly half of Internet users
in the U.S. [34, 83] and nearly three quarters of people who play online games have experienced
some form of online abuse [82].
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During the 1990s, software peer production communities [8] began to form, with famous ex-
amples such as the GNU/Linux operating system [7, 116] and the collaborative encyclopedia
Wikipedia [41]. Like discussion communities, peer production communities must contend with
unwanted behavior such as vandalism [47] and sockpuppetry [122]. However, peer production
communities often maintain stricter standards for contribution. This can result in barriers for
newcomers, including having their first contribution met with no response, impolite responses, or
responses that are too complex for them to understand [124]. Peer production communities also
may have certain productivity goals, and repetitive conflicts such as “edit wars” on Wikipedia [72]
or other intransigent disputes [62] can reduce productivity.
Communities face additional governance challenges as they begin to grow in size [33, 54]. In
the case of discussion groups, which tend to have only one or a small number of moderators,
those moderators complain of time-consuming labor needed to filter out content [26], as well as
burnout from the emotional toll of constantly encountering toxicity [32]. To manage an increasing
volume of content, some platforms have invested in machine learning tools to automatically remove
unwanted content [67]. While spam today is mostly dealt with automatically, mitigating other forms
of unwelcome content such as misinformation and harassment is harder to automate because of their
contextual nature [9, 60]. With a growing number of community members, manymay be unaware of
established norms [70]. While some communities resolve these problems with more rules governing
participation [16], they also run the risk of turning away newer members [54, 78, 124], resulting in
low conversion rates of casual users to core contributors [104] and entrenched leadership [119].
The problem of scale reaches new magnitudes when it comes to massive, centralized social
media platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter, where much of online social activity resides today.
Governance decisions by major platforms, such as the early decision by Facebook to enforce a
real-name policy [53], have tremendous ramifications for society given the size of their user base
and the inability for many people to opt out of such platforms to participate in society. As they
have grown, platforms have become the “new governors” of our increasingly digital lives [74],
and the governance that platforms provide have become a major component of their product
offering [50]. In that regard, many platforms have been criticized for their lack of transparency
around governing [42], the slow response to emerging user problems such as harassment [46], the
outsourcing of content moderation to large teams of people under poor working conditions [111],
and the lack of user input into governance decisions beyond low-level flagging [25].
2.2 Governance Patterns in Online Communities
Recognizing the importance and ubiquity of these problems, researchers have taken interest in
how communities tackle them. The findings from such work have informed our approach in what
follows.
The largest social media platforms have attracted attention for their responses to governance
problems, with a particular focus on the broader societal effects of their governance choices [13, 14,
50, 51, 107, 111, 133]. The literature tends to take a critical posture, highlighting the marginalization
of user input [25, 81, 90] and focusing on how the profit motive leads to governance decisions
that are not in the interests of users [35, 97]. Nevertheless, centralized governance has undeniable
benefits: it is simple, efficient, and widely supported by platforms. Analyses of centrally governed
communities become more sympathetic as those communities become smaller and flatter; for
instance, the group of researchers that produced Building Successful Online Communities [79]
provide a well-organized overview of insights into the problems these communities face and
strategies for solving them.
Closer to the democratic ideals of early Internet evangelists [134], self-governing communities
occupy several seminal studies of online culture, as in research on the LambdaMOO andMicroMUSE
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platforms [31, 96, 121], in which crisis events galvanized virtual communities in ways that spurred
action and even led to formal governance schemes. Several important online organizations employ
remarkably democratic governance models. These include the World Wide Web Consortium, the
Wikimedia Foundation, the Apache Software Foundation, the Debian operating system, and, after
a recent restructuring, the developers of the Python programming language. Among these large-
scale, more-and-less participatory organizations, the projects of the Wikimedia Foundation have
attracted the most governance research, English Wikipedia in particular [16, 41, 57, 68]. Other
large platforms have dabbled with more circumscribed experiments in democracy [77, 129], or seen
such experiments emerge from the user community [37, 47, 65, 89]. While these more democratic
examples play crucial roles in Internet infrastructure, their governance is more an exception than
the rule. They also tend to rely on bespoke processes and tools, rather than easily replicable ones.
Alongside such procedural democracies, researchers have investigated the many platforms that
rely onmore decentralized structures. Examples of this include USENET [75], mailing lists, Facebook
groups, Reddit communities, file-sharing networks [56, 85], the Tor network [55], blockchain
protocols [27, 105, 110], and, of course, the World Wide Web itself. Independent units of these
platforms may be seen to adopt many types of governance styles, but considered as population of
populations, they can be characterized by the freedom users have to exit any one community for
any other—that is, they favor “exit” over “voice” [59]. Member communities of these platforms are
most likely not represented in platform-scale decisions, but through grassroots collective action,
campaigns have exercised the platform-scale influence they formally lack [91].
This self-organization is especially evident in their ability to develop free and flexible "off-
platform" software tools for addressing the governance challenges they share in common, whether
via general tool libraries [22, 66], templating mechanics [16, 39], or even community-led randomized
experiments [93]. For example, in lieu of centralized platform action on unwanted behavior, commu-
nity members and end users have piloted new governance designs to dissuade norm violators [92]
and protect against harassers [46, 86], as well as to facilitate reconciliation between conflicted mem-
bers [115] and provide community support for victims [10]. Self-organization is also evident in the
ability of communities to develop and sustain widely held informal norm systems [20, 21, 112, 126].
Research on online criminal communities is an especially rich source of insight into the potential of
norm-heavy governance systems [55, 113]. Complementing the research community’s overall faith
that technology can play a supporting role in online governance, researchers agree that technology
alone does not define a governance system or determine its success. Cases abound demonstrating
the importance of a healthy culture to a platform’s continued existence, regardless of its structures
of governance [18, 24, 49, 52, 70, 71, 117].
Prior research suggests that although sophisticated and democratic governance is possible in
online communities, it is difficult and rare. The tools available to communities far more often leave
users to develop governance practices in an informal, ad hoc fashion.
2.3 Institutional Analysis and Development
Questions of governance design are of great interest outside of the sciences of information and
technology, particularly in the social sciences. Yet social scientists have generally been reluctant
to move beyond classification and characterization into design. Plato and Aristotle each offered
taxonomies of political systems, employing such labels as monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy;
their emphasis on categorizing macro-level structures—assuming a closed set of possible governance
forms—continues to hold sway, even as more recent typologies of comparative politics introduce
multi-dimensional complexity so as to reflect the interplay of diverse institutions and practices
found in modern governments [11, 36, 84]. What governance design approaches do exist in the
social sciences have tended to adopt the convenience of assuming a powerful designer, such
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as a head of state, manager, or administrator. This describes the dynamical systems [40] and
cybernetics [6, 123] branches of complex systems theory, which were both introduced as social
design paradigms. Design approaches in the management literature on organizational processes
recognize managers as a type of designer [5, 28, 87]. Economics has a rich literature on market-
mechanism design, which has been successful enough to influence contexts from voting systems to
spectrum allocation [17, 63, 80, 106]. Deviating from governance design, but also from top-down
design, participatory design frameworks are premised on the importance of broadening the design
process to include all types of stakeholders [3, 69]. This participatory tradition has been formative
to the development of CSCW and modern HCI [4].
Even allowing this range of examples, we conclude that social science has given surprisingly
little attention to general and systematic techniques for crafting governance institutions. Fortu-
nately, growing interest in natural-resource management and skepticism toward rigid market/state
dichotomies have led to rapid development in a form of institutional inquiry oriented around the
design of governance across a wide range of social contexts, one beginning with participant agency
rather than macro-level structure. This effort has been centered at the OstromWorkshop at Indiana
University, founded by political scientists Elinor and Vincent Ostrom. Their Institutional Analysis
and Development (IAD) framework, though focused on analysis, is well suited to the challenge of
design. In fact, it was aspirationally intended to become a design tool: in IAD’s first instantiation,
the “D” stood for “Design” [100].
An important feature of IAD is its sensitivity to the diversity and complexity that tend to emerge
among actually existing human governance regimes [95, 99, 101]. This commitment to empiricism
has put it at odds with the theory-driven approaches that have dominated the sciences of governance,
a tension captured by “Ostrom’s Law,” which asserts that “a resource arrangement that works in
practice can work in theory” [38]. IAD’s empirical orientation, and its consequent openness to
not-yet-theorized governance forms, has equipped it to capture institutional complexity.
IAD’s basic unit of institutional structure, the “action situation,” is a game-like confluence
of conditions in which participants make individual choices and collective decisions [94, 98].
To represent more complex institutions, IAD represents action situations as occurring within
aggregations of modular “holons” [101]. IAD normally allows for participant involvement in shaping
the core rule-set of holons in their shared institutions [44]. The OstromWorkshop community went
on to develop a general concept of polycentricity, which describes the even more complex interplay
of multiple institutions that the Ostroms observed in the field [102, 103]. The polycentric frame can
encompass overlapping, interacting, and competing divisions of power that simultaneously shape
participants’ action situations. For example, how storm water runs in and out of a city may depend
on activity from many levels of government (federal, state, county, and municipal), many divisions
of government (planning departments, parks departments, and waste management departments),
many modalities of government (legislatures, courts, and law enforcement), and many stakeholders
in government (officials, NGOs, and citizens). A recurrent finding of IAD research is the presence
of governance at a level of complexity congruent to the complexity of the social-ecological system
with which it interfaces [99].
Previous research about online governance has adopted the IAD framework [41, 44, 45, 75, 79, 110,
116, 118, 120, 130]. We argue for a further embrace of the IAD approach in online governance design,
adopting IAD’s emphasis on the agency and creativity of participants. The notion of governance
as interlinked action situations is ideal for designing complex governance environments from a
user-centric point of view, rather than presuming an idealized and highly constrained agent (as
in game theory) or abstracting away participant agency by focusing on structure (as in much
comparative political analysis). Still, IAD scholars have yet to rigorously formalize the precise
nature of these aggregations and their linkages, what specific ties are permitted between games,
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or how they come to faithfully represent a real-world institution [95]. The approach we propose
could be described as inviting communities to formalize the holons that constitute their own action
situations, which communities can thread together across polycentric networks.
The IAD legacy heavily informs the design goals we adopt here. The pursuit of modularity
reflects the holonic view of institutions as evolutionary aggregations of constituent parts, rather
than pre-defined systems that fit a rigid taxonomy [76]. (In porting IAD to a computational system,
we recognize parallels with the Unix design philosophy [108], which also defines small, simple
elements that enable the creation of complex systems made up of interconnected parts.) In place of
categorizing systems, IAD identifies general patterns of practice across wildly diverse systems—
suggesting, as we do, that a common toolkit can and should serve a wide range of applications.
IAD’s appreciation that evolved institutions are interlinked in complex ways informs our interest in
interoperability, while its focus on institution-scale learning and growth aligns it with our interests
in diffusion and innovation through portability.
2.4 A New Approach
There is need for an improved paradigm for online governance design, one that can move beyond
simplistic dichotomies and closed taxonomies to encompass the vast observed variety of governance
problems, solutions, and styles. Such a paradigm should help prepare platforms for the governance
problems they so often encounter, including those of protecting against bad behavior, of provisioning
peer-produced public goods and preserving commons, of adapting to growth and change, and of
managing power and its dynamics.
Given the bewildering variety of governance institutions and their complex relationship with
culture, an online governance paradigm should enable communities to customize their processes at
every level. Doing so requires an approach to governance systems that is modular, so that users
can compose systems from the bottom up. It should be open-ended, with sufficient expressiveness
to implement diverse systems while also being as neutral as possible about the institutional forms
it can express.
As communities struggle with changes in their user base or operating environment, they benefit
from being able to quickly iterate through targeted institutional changes. This process will be easier
if communities are able to borrow and adapt working solutions from each other. To facilitate this, a
modular governance paradigm should also ensure that its components are portable across contexts.
Power is a frequent theme in the research on online governance. Runaway concentrations of
power appear in unexpected places and can result in harm to users. The literature makes clear that
decentralization is not a cure-all and simultaneously that a platform can have a skewed distribution
of power and still function stably, effectively, and in the interest of its users. Any platform’s approach
to power will make it susceptible to several possible, even characteristic, modes of failure. An online
governance standard that can prepare systems for this variety—with whichever combination of
internal checks, exit options, participation, federation, and values—will be interoperable.
With Modular Politics, we seek to outline a paradigm that empowers online communities to
assemble discrete, programmable building-blocks into original and complex governance regimes
that reflect their aspirations and needs. The model we describe is capable of implementing gover-
nance mechanisms, connecting them into higher level constructions, organizing information, and
managing resources. Tools created for one community can be adopted in others. The model also
supports interaction among distinct communities and across networked platforms.
3 THE MODEL
In this section, we present a preliminary overview of how the Modular Politics model might
operate, drawing on the four design goals outlined above as well as the IAD research paradigm.
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Specialized terms are capitalized. The terms used here serve to establish a common vocabulary
among developers, but in specific implementations, developers may replace them with a vocabulary
more appropriate to their world-building context.
3.1 Platforms, Instances, and Orgs
Modular Politics is not a standalone system but must be implemented within an underlying
Platform—perhaps a game, social network, or blockchain protocol. An implementation of Modular
Politics is called an Instance. The Instance defines the interface between Modular Politics and the
underlying Platform—specifying the entities from the Platform that have a role in the governance
process and the actions that they can take on the Platform. In defining the Instance, Platform
operators determine who has access to Modular Politics and what it has the power to govern.
Within an Instance, governance occurs through computational domains called Orgs. Orgs provide
the institutional context for what IAD calls action situations in Modular Politics. Org creation
allows for mimicking a variety of organizational types, such as companies, clubs, guilds, charities,
and more. An Instance’s Org or Orgs may be specified by Platform operators in advance; the
system’s participants may also be allowed to create and join their own Orgs voluntarily. Orgs can
be nested or formed in parallel; when one Org is created within another, its members can include
any members of the parent Org. Orgs are constrained only by the fact that their members are
also subject to any other Orgs within which they are members. This accords with the practice of
"nesting," which Elinor Ostrom observed as a recurrent pattern in commons-based governance.
3.2 Modules
Following the IAD concept of modular holons, participants in Modular Politics take action through
computational Modules. Modules are configurable software packages that can alter the behavior of
processes that run within an Instance or an Org. A Module’s editable configuration options are
called Policies. Compatible Modules can be combined to form more complex Modules. Modules, as
their name suggests, are critical for achieving the design goals of modularity in this model, as well
as arbitrary expressiveness; rather than prescribing specific governance systems, Modular Politics
enables a bottom-up approach to system creation.
The designs for Modules may include typed inputs and outputs, which help facilitate conjoining
Modules into ever more complex ones. The inputs and outputs can be Users, Resources, Orgs, or
other types of data; inputs and outputs can also come from other Instances (or non-Modular Politics
systems) through API calls, if permission Policies allow. For example, a Module that outputs a
decision can provide input for a Module on a separate Instance that translates the decision into a
Policy change. This kind of interoperability is essential for supporting what IAD regards as the
inevitable emergence of polycentricity.
Modules are also transparent. Their underlying source code, as well as their configuration Policies,
are accessible to anyone who can view and interact with them, so users can audit the mechanics of
their behavior. This includes Modules on separate Instances being accessed through API calls; the
API enables remote access to Module source, both for inspection and adoption. Doing so buttresses
the model’s design goals of interoperability and portability.
Modules can change the states of entities in their Org based on given inputs, or they can merely
provide relevant information by measuring and analyzing the states of entities or other Modules.
Modules can have more than one functionality depending on how they are called. For example,
a single Module for petitions can be called by Users to either create a new petition, sign an existing
one, or query a petition’s status. Policy configurations specify these various behaviors. A Module
for an elected forum-moderator will include a Policy specifying the length of the moderator’s term
and another specifying the threshold of support required for the moderator to be elected.
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Fig. 1. The relationships among the Platform, an Instance of Modular Politics (the shaded section), and the
entities therein. The Instances defines which entities are available to Orgs within it.
3.3 Entities
An Instance can include two types of entities:
• Users are causative agents, such as humans or bots
• Resources are objects or actions that Users can affect
Elinor Ostrom stressed the importance of clarifying the bounds of membership and purview
in a self-governing community. In Modular Politics, each entity has a state in the Instance and
contributes to the state of the Instance as a whole. These entities can also become members of the
Orgs in their Instance, which makes their states subject to the Modules that govern any Org they
join. Entities may be assigned to particular Orgs by the Platform operator, or through voluntary
agreements among Users. Users can assign that Resource to membership in that Org. If the Org is
nested within another Org, entities must belong or be added to the parent Org in order to join.
The Instance configuration determines the relationship between Users and Resources in Modular
Politics and the Platform. This relationship includes an identity management system for Users, as
well as establishing any correlation between Resources and their manifestation on the Platform.
For example, the set of Users might include all players in a Platform’s multiplayer game; Resources
might include gold-coin objects in the game and a magic wand that can appoint a player as a wizard
in the game’s world. To achieve the design goals of expressiveness and portability, it should be
possible to connect virtually any kind of computational object a Platform might have into a User or
Resource in Modular Politics.
3.4 Monitors
Monitors are "read-only" Modules that provide feedback by evaluating specific conditions according
to consistent criteria. Their analyses can take place over a certain duration or based on a snapshot
at the time the Monitor is queried.
Monitors can gather data from throughout the system, such as by querying the states of specific
Modules, Users, and Resources, or by querying the Policies that specify how a Module behaves.
Monitor outputs can consist of multiple data types, such as a binary value (whether or not certain
criteria are satisfied), a fractional value (such as a percentage score based on partial satisfaction of
criteria), or an array (multiple data points on a given query). These outputs provide information on
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the states and behaviors of entities or Modules. For example, consider a turn-based game in which
players can obtain gold-coin Resources:
• A “census” Monitor queries the number of gold coins that each user controls.
• A “mobility” Monitor employs the “census” to measure, over the last 10 turns in the game,
the rate at which Users gain and lose coins.
• A third Module—which is not a Monitor—ensures that Users with over 100 coins lose power
to vote on proposals in the case of a low “mobility” score—incentivizing those users to use
their coins to spur greater dynamism.
Monitors can be highly focused like these examples, or they can draw from a wide range of
data—such as User behavior, Module Policy configurations, and other states in the Org. They can
also acquire considerable complexity by integrating diverse data sources or aggregating multiple
other Modules through nesting. As a special type of Module, Monitors are intrinsically composable
and thus contribute to the larger objective of modularity. A sophisticated Monitor could make
broad claims about the nature of an Org, akin to indexes that evaluate the democratic health of
governments [30, 48]. Because Monitors’ source code and Policy configurations are available for
inspection, their analytic methods should be in principle transparent.
3.5 Permissions
Access and authority in Modular Politics may not be equally distributed. Permissions are part of the
configuration Policies for any Instance, Org, and Module. These permissions specify what actions
Users can take in a particular environment. A User can create a new Org within an Instance, for
example, only if the Instance’s Policies grant that User the ability to do so. A Module can only query
the state of a given Org if the User triggering that Module has obtained the necessary permissions
to query that Org.
In addition to specifying permissions within a given Instance or Org, a Module’s Policies state
whether it allows external API calls from other Instances, which may be on the same Platform
or another. Such permissions are necessary in order to ensure that the goal of interoperability is
handled responsibly. Moreover, a Module might be configured to allow for certain functions to be
called only by specific Users, or it might allow access based on Users’ membership in certain Orgs
or Instances.
Restrictions defined in a particular Instance or Org are automatically applicable to every Org
created within it; permissions are inherited hierarchically. For example, if an Instance forbids
external API calls, none of its Orgs can accept external API calls from Instances on other Platforms.
Conversely, if an Instance is configured to accept external API calls, it will be possible for external
Modular Politics Instances to interact with entities and Modules in the Instance—assuming that
such interaction isn’t elsewhere restricted. One Platform’s Instance, consequently, could provide
governance services to other Instances through APIs.
Consider some hypothetical examples:
• A “lockbox” Module contains Policies that allow Users to access a particular set of Resources.
One of these Policies, for example, allows certain Users to see the password for the commu-
nity’s online banking account.
• A “User tracker” Monitor will accept queries about User behavior only if the User triggering
the Module is listed as a designated supervisor. Some of these supervisors are on external
Instances and access the monitor through API calls.
• An “executive branch” Module implements an election mechanism to designate a particular
User as holding the president role over a large federated network of Instances. Users from
these Instances have voting rights in the Module, which has been deployed on a trusted
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Instance on the network. Once elected, the president alone can trigger the executive functions
of the Module, which has the power to affect the state of entities on all member Instances.
Like other entity states, the content of Policies may be queried by any entity they interact with.
The Policies of a Module also determine the procedure for changing its Policies—such as whether
changes can be made only by a particular set of Users or through another Module, such as a petition
process or a ballot.
3.6 Further Configuration
Just as IAD emphasizes the need for participants to shape their governance environments, Modular
Politics aims to provide wide latitude for configuring a governance environment without requiring
extensive technical knowledge. Platform operators and their Users, if they have the necessary
permissions, can create and customize their own governance systems. Configuration of these
systems occurs at the level of the Instance, Org, and Module. Some Instances may have all their
Orgs and Modules predefined by the Platform operators, with no opportunity for change or
configuration by Users; other Instances may enable Users to modify the arrangement of Orgs and
Modules as they choose. Operators can specify a fixed set of Modules available to their Users, or they
can allow users the flexibility to acquire their own Modules. Discrete Platforms and communities
using Modular Politics should be able to share, copy, and modify each other’s Modules and Policies
through public or private code repositories. Meeting the design goal of portability will be essential
for accelerating governance innovation among users.
Moreover, to enable advanced configuration, Modular Politics encourages the use of software
development kits (SDKs), which can be both internal or external to a given Platform. Through an
SDK with an intuitive interface, Platform operators and participants alike might browse existing
Modules or create their own; they might also adapt, customize, and debug these Modules before
importing them into an Instance. SDKs could offer such features as a visual scripting editor [15] or
a computational language [132] to support the development of fine-grained governance structures
regardless of a person’s technical skill level. Ensuring that Modules are portable, enabling users to
adopt ones created for other platforms, will mean that people lacking the technical skills to create
their own Modules can nevertheless choose and adopt tools created by others.
3.7 Interface and Experience
Any Instance of Modular Politics must operate within a Platform, which can range in complexity
from a simple Web server to a cloud-based multiplayer game or a blockchain protocol. Platform
operators will have to implement strategies for defining and circumscribing the role of Modular
Politics in the context of the host system, restricting the scope to particular participants and spheres
of influence. Operators will also need to define how any particular Instance of Modular Politics
interacts with their own systems. For Modular Politics to be effective, it should blend into its
environment.
Modular Politics does not specify the details of interface or appearance, enabling developers
to adapt the system to their needs. Yet, for the sake of clarity and consistency, Modular Politics
should enforce some basic, shared logics of interaction. The design goal of portability should extend
not just to Modules, that is, but also to user experience. A person who gains proficiency using a
Modular Politics system on one Platform will hence be able to transfer that proficiency to another
Platform.
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(a)
(b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2. A set of example configuration interfaces for Orgs and Modules. (a) depicts a text-only representation
that approximates an Org’s textual constitution or code of conduct, (b) depicts only the actual configuration
options of Modules along pre-defined parameters, (c) interpolates text with code snippets in a notebook-style
interface, and (d) presents a possible end-user interface produced by the underlying Modules. Note that
configuration Policies could also be made through visual programming or a simplified palette of options.
12 Anonymous
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 3. Examples of interfaces analogous to the kinds of configurations possible in Modular Politics. (a)
MultiMC, a user-developed, open-source server manager and mod manager for Minecraft, (b) interface
for setting rules for Facebook Groups; the rules here are templates suggested by Facebook, (c) Reddit
Automoderator, a simple interface for implementing automated content moderation rules, (d) proposal
settings on Loomio, a collective decision-making platform, (e) Curseforge, an addon manager and website for
addons to several games, including World of Warcraft, (f) the Constitute Project, a collection of historical and
in-force constitutions organized by an extensive ontology of terms.
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3.8 Implementation Strategies
We have outlined in general terms how Modular Politics might operate. But we have not specified
the particular form it should take in software. Any implementation should be capable of meeting the
goals stated at the outset: modularity, expressiveness, cross-platform portability, and cross-platform
interoperability.
One approach to achieving these goals would be to offer Modular Politics solely through one
central cloud-based service, which various Platforms would call upon over an API to handle
their own governance processes. Such a centralized approach could provide a single, convenient
repository of vetted Modules and assure the consistency and reliability of all hosted Instances.
Centralization could also help fund the development of Modular Politics, since access to the API
might require paying fees to the organization that manages it. Yet some organizations might be
reluctant to trust an external authority to provide a service as crucial as governance.
An alternative would be to define Modular Politics itself as a decentralized application running
on a distributed-ledger technology (DLT) protocol; various Platforms could act as nodes on the
protocol without delegating control over these processes to any central authority. But relying on
DLTs might also introduce scalability and usability limitations; many such systems have not yet
proven ready for widespread adoption. Furthermore, DLTs usually depend on token economics
that could impose financial barriers on the adoption of Modular Politics. The economic imperatives
of DLTs would also significantly constrain the expressiveness of Modular Politics for diverse types
of institutions. While Modular Politics should be implementable on DLTs, it should not presume
DLT infrastructure or that of any other specific type of software platform.
We believe the most flexible strategy would be to define an open standard, which can be im-
plemented through a variety of open-source software libraries (perhaps resulting in a full-fledged
software framework). The open standard would define the features and behaviors of any Modular
Politics system, allowing for interoperability even when the actual implementations differ. Modular
Politics could thus enable many kinds of Platforms to develop in tandem, through both replication
and direct interaction [88]. The modularity of Modular Politics thereby occurs not just within a
particular community but potentially through polycentric relationships among them.
By creating an open standard for a governance protocol, there would be no need to depend on a
single organization’s API or rely on the kinds of “cryptoeconomics” that DLT systems require—
although both would be possible to implement. Additionally, because our design goals of cross-
platform portability and interoperability are more complex and less essential for some use-cases,
the standard should allow for implementations that don’t include all the features described here.
As with open-source projects like Debian and Python, the development of the standard and its
libraries should be community-governed, presumably using Modular Politics itself. Through such
distributed collaboration, it is our hope that Modular Politics could become a widespread and
extensible layer for governance on the Internet.
4 USE CASES
In order to elucidate how Modular Politics might operate in practice, we illustrate its scope with
several specific scenarios in which such a system might be employed. The purpose of these hypo-
thetical examples is to illustrate the range of institutions that a successful Modular Politics could
serve.
The participants in these scenarios experience action situations based on a set of pliable, co-
determined governance conditions. Participants encounter an interface that enables them to navi-
gate among the various features of the system, take action, and modify the system. Rather than
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Fig. 4. A schematic implementation of the system described in Example 1.
adopting ad hoc governance practices within a rigid set of constraints, participants have the ca-
pacity to develop and employ tools appropriate to their communities’ needs. Particular Modular
Politics systems also have the option of interoperability with other systems, sharing governance
mechanisms and corresponding data.
4.1 Example 1: Social-media moderation
Consider an affinity-based group on a social-media platform in which several thousand members
share and discuss news about sculpture. The founders of the group adopted a simple system that
enables members of the group to create governance proposals and pass them with a referendum-
style vote by a majority of active members.
A controversy arises because some members begin posting pictures of sculptures that other
members consider obscene and do not want to see in their feeds. Members begin proposing rules
about what kinds of content should not be allowed, and several proposals pass by a majority
vote. The founders, who have moderation authority by default, attempt to implement the rules
by removing offending posts. But members begin to complain that the founders are being sloppy
and non-transparent in how they interpret the rules. One member proposes to add a new tool
that implements juries in the group, and the proposal passes. After that, whenever a user flags
a post as offensive, it disappears and the platform queries five randomly selected members who
previously volunteered for jury duty. If jury members support the removal of a post, they have to
specify which rule or rules they believe it has broken. If no members object, the post is removed
permanently. Otherwise, it reappears in the group.
This system satisfies most members, but a few raise concerns that the moderation has turned into
overly zealous censorship. Although they cannot convince a majority to rescind the system, they
do succeed in passing a proposal for a bot that automatically displays statistics on how many posts
were flagged and how the juries voted on them. This feedback helps reveal which rules seem most
ambiguous to juries, spurring the development of more refined rule definitions and, eventually,
lower rates of removal.
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Fig. 5. A schematic implementation of the system described in Example 2.
4.2 Example 2: Multiplayer game guild
Consider a multiplayer virtual game in which teams known as guilds compete with each other
to acquire resources and earn points by building skyscrapers. The game operates on a federated
network structure in which each guild operates on a separate user-administered server across a
shared protocol. Guilds may be as large as 100 players each, and they make collective decisions
about strategies for resource acquisition, architecture, and construction. The rules of the game are
fixed, but the guild associations can choose governance structures for themselves from a large pool
of available options. Players are free to choose which guild they want to join for a given round—or
they can form their own and attempt to attract others to join. At the start of each round, server
administrators assemble a set of governance structures for the guilds they want to form, and other
players can use a guild-comparison tool to examine the governance regimes and member attributes
in each guild before choosing which guild to join.
These guilds can take a variety of forms. Guild founders with high levels of reputation in the
game—as well as in other games using Modular Politics—tend to succeed in attracting players to
join autocratic guild structures, as past accomplishments imbue trust in those founders’ leadership.
Less established founders tend to do better by devising more democratic or meritocratic structures,
which can be attractive to ambitious players who would like to rise to positions of leadership
based on their persuasiveness or actions. In many cases, such founders have an incentive to create
regimes in which they themselves will not remain in power; they gain reputation for designing a
successful guild even if they lose authority within it. A diverse range of options for governance
thus emerges, as does an ever-growing variety of creative governance techniques.
4.3 Example 3: Open-source software project
Consider an open-source software project that produces a popular, privacy-focusedmobile operating
system. Its founder is a developer who comes to be regarded as a “benevolent dictator for life,” or
BDFL. Although she is generally respected, her unvarnished leadership style frequently distracts the
community from its core development work. The project hosts its codebase at BitGit, a decentralized,
blockchain-based repository protocol that supports Modular Politics. In one of her moments
of exasperation, the BDFL assembles a governance system that resembles a liberal democratic
government, with distinct, elected bodies for establishing policies (legislative), implementing those
policies (executive), and overseeing the implementation (judicial). To vote or hold office, a developer
needs to hold a staking token obtained from making at least one contribution incorporated into the
codebase during the past year.
The former BDFL at first refrains from seeking office in the new system, but she doesn’t exactly
relinquish leadership. Her charismatic authority continues to hold sway, and the new elected
leaders complain that they don’t have sufficient mandate to carry out their roles and expect
community support. They introduce a monitoring system into the project’s BitGit interface that
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Fig. 6. A schematic implementation of the system described in Example 3.
show statistics on participation in the governance process, both for the project as a whole and
for any given individual developer. The system also compares these statistics with those of other
software projects on the BitGit ledger also using Modular Politics. This puts public pressure on
developers to participate more actively in governance, and when they do, they tend to listen more
to each other than to the BDFL’s opinions. Eventually, the BDFL runs for a seat on the legislative
body and is elected, thus channeling her role through the system she created.
5 DISCUSSION
Modular Politics, as it has been presented in this paper, is a strategy for enabling online communities
to experiment with a wider variety of governance structures than is typically possible on existing
Internet platforms. Its logic draws heavily on the logic of holonic, polycentric action situations
as described in IAD research. Beyond simply replicating governance practices found elsewhere,
online or offline, the model enables users to investigate novel opportunities for governance in the
digital realm. Modular Politics could enact governance models that do not (and perhaps could not)
exist in the offline world, inviting platform operators and their users to devise novel organizational
practices for themselves.
On the one hand, we hope Modular Politics might enable online communities to adopt democratic
practices more often than they presently do. But regardless of the systems they adopt, we suspect
there will be benefits to making governance a more explicit feature of communities’ experience,
so as to prevent them from falling into a "tyranny of structurelessness" [43]—a tyranny that has
made no exception for technologists [23]. Our aim is not to make a moral or normative case for
how online governance should be, but rather to empower all types of communities to develop
experiments in governance.
For researchers, the computational nature of Modular Politics provides a means for studying
the emergence and effects of various governance systems, including novel ones. User data has
the potential to inform an ongoing conversation with existing social and political theories. The
model already provides for reflecting back to users significant data on governance processes. Where
appropriate, and according to policies set by platforms and communities themselves, this data could
enable social scientists to generate new and more useful taxonomies of governance practices that,
if properly analyzed, could contribute to improving the governance practices in various contexts.
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Beyond the immediate, practical benefits of such research, evidence from Modular Politics could
contribute to the development of more robust theories of computational governance.
If implemented as an open standard, rather than as a centralized platform, Modular Politics could
contribute to furthering the vision of what has been called "Web 3.0"—an open and interoperable
network of online services that resist the tendencies of centralization that have become so persistent
on the Internet today. In the context of governance, this means that a particular community could
rely on a variety of integrated services in order to achieve a particular governance structure that
spans across multiple platforms. For instance, a community developing open-source software could
choose to combine the reputation system of the social news platform Slashdot and moderation
standards of a particular group on Reddit in order to assign influence to different users within the
community’s governance structure. Deliberation could occur on Discord chat, whereas decisions
on the decision-making could be done on the Loomio platform. Once a decision has been made, the
implications could be automatically enforced across the relevant platforms. An open standard for
governance could thereby contribute to the emergence of specialised services designed to respond
to the needs of different communities, while maintaining a high level of integration across these
services in order to ensure a cohesive experience of community governance. It is our hope that
such a model will inspire users to develop ever more sophisticated governance techniques, which
others can adopt in their own contexts.
In addition to fostering new types of online governance innovation and experimentation, we
hope to see the effects of Modular Politics extend beyond online communities to political cultures
more broadly. If Modular Politics is successful in accelerating the pace of governance innovation
through experimentation, the resulting insights can be instantiated in a variety of communities,
regardless of the medium of choice. Whereas people typically experience governance in workplaces
and governments as fixed and remote, Modular Politics could make the practice of designing
and testing governance systems far more widespread, and contribute to the revitalization of civic
engagement that the Internet has so long promised and struggled to deliver. While many people’s
experiences of democracy tend to be limited to such mechanisms as electing representatives or
voting in referendums, Modular Politics could expose them to other forms, such as delegative voting
systems or sortition. There is surely also a wide spectrum of alternative democratic governance
models that have yet to be conceived. Online communities could become powerful laboratories
testing new ideas and learning from the failures and successes of other communities, potentially
spurring a renaissance in democratic culture.
6 LIMITATIONS
Modular Politics, along with our treatment of it here, has a number of limitations. We begin with
limitations of this paper, indicating future work.
First, we have argued for the importance of governance innovation throughout this article but
have not proven (conceptually or empirically) that it would be easier to innovate in Modular Politics
than otherwise. We believe that modularity and portability, in particular, will accelerate innovation,
but there are many factors (e.g., software usability, software variability or malleability, programming
language design, simulation and inference tools) that could help or hinder the effectiveness of
Modular Politics as a tool for innovation.
Second, we have not defined exactly what kinds of new governance systems and structures
would and would not be expressible in Modular Politics. For example, future research that takes a
more mathematical approach might define an explicit space of governance structures and prove
that Modular Politics is able to recover all elements in that space.
Third, although Modular Politics is intended for diverse uses and to be neutral with respect to
different institutional forms, our formulation surely bears built-in political biases that we have yet
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to interrogate. All technological artifacts such as this carry political qualities, whether because
they tend to be used for certain political purposes or because their design inclines toward a certain
political system or philosophy [131]. We can likely learn from early user testing how better to
make Modular Politics as agnostic among forms of governance as possible.
There are also limitations of Modular Politics as a model, indicating fundamental constraints
and issues of scope.
First, Modular Politics is not intended as a proposal for offline community governance. While
we believe that online experiments will eventually teach us much about about offline governance,
we have chosen to narrow the scope of our present inquiry to communities that exist and interact
mostly online through digital platforms and messaging services.
Second, Modular Politics does not constitute or aspire to be a complete theory of governance. It
is, rather, a proposal for tools that might support various forms of governance within a "digital
state of nature." The model can, however, serve as the basis of theoretical claims and empirical tests
about the system and the behavior of its users.
Finally, and of particular importance, we emphasize once again that constructing an effective
system of governance requires more than just software. Cultural and contextual factors are also
essential [12]. Modular Politics does not specify, but depends upon, a broader "civic sphere," by which
we mean the confluence of tools, culture, and context through which participants interact. A healthy
civic sphere is one in which participants feel confidence that the governance process is meaningfully
accountable to them [29], with some kind of shared norms, appropriate information flows, and the
power to influence decisions. Crafting the civic sphere is the job of platform operators, community
leaders, and community members as a whole. For example, a particular community might adopt
language that makes governance activities appear fun and silly, or alternatively grave and serious.
Policies might require prospective participants to agree to act in good faith, or other prerequisites,
before joining the community. Platform operators might choose to implement Modular Politics
in ways that bear biases toward more or less democratic practices. Users in positions of authority
might choose to emphasize negative sanctions for rule-breakers or positive reinforcement. These
kinds of choices are vitally important, and Modular Politics does not prescribe them. Modular
Politics, as with any procedural or computational system, is no replacement for other aspects of a
healthy civic sphere.
7 CONCLUSION
The tools available for governance in online communities are currently limited, inflexible, and
ill-equipped for governance innovation. Modular Politics seeks to encourage such innovation
through a dynamic, flexible model for online governance, through which community members can
engage in creating and experimenting with a variety of different governance techniques. As such,
Modular Politics could accelerate and proliferate innovation in governance design well beyond
what occurs in offline systems, which carry considerable burdens of inertia and path dependence.
Ultimately, a successful open standard for governance could contribute to making creative and
responsive governance a more widespread norm—both online and offline.
This paper is a preliminary step toward that goal. Much research and experimentation remains
in order to define a standard that is both durable and attractive for platforms to adopt, which would
require specifying Modular Politics in much greater detail than we have done here. We hope at
least to have spurred interest in the challenges to come.
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